

BACKGROUND FACTS

NO COUNTRY, NO HONOUR, NO HOPE

Cuban Counter-Revolutionary Émigrés in the U.S.A.

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PLANES carrying the ringleaders of the overthrown Batista regime began to land one after another in the United States early in the morning of January 1, 1959. Among those who fled from popular retribution to seek sanctuary with their masters were Ruben Batista, the tyrant's son, Tabernilla, Chief of the General Staff, Pilar Garcia, chief of police, Rodriguez Calderon, commander of the navy, and other top officials and their retinue—a few hundred men all told (Batista himself found asylum in the Dominican Republic).

That was the start of the Cuban counter-revolutionary emigration in the United States. In the following years, it was destined to play a truly sinister part both in international affairs and in the domestic policy of the United States.

HOSPITALITY WITH A PURPOSE

THE U.S. authorities received Batista's men with open arms. They were not interned in immigration centres and their luggage was not inspected by the customs authorities. All red tape was cut to facilitate their entry. The immigration authorities explained that the Cubans had been given asylum in keeping "with tradition", like other political refugees from Latin American countries.

Subsequent developments have shown that "tradition" had nothing to do with it. U.S. hospitality was explained by Washington's far-reaching plans to use the refugees to overthrow the Cuban revolutionary Government. U.S. imperialism needed the enemies of the revolution to camouflage its plans against the Cuban revolution, on the one hand, and to implement these plans, on the other.

White Rose, the first counter-revolutionary group of Cuban émigrés began to operate in New York in June 1959. It proclaimed an armed struggle against the revolutionary

Government of Cuba as its aim. White Rose was headed by such odious Batista figures as Nunez Portuondo, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations, Senator Rolando Masferrer, General Pedraza and Rafael Dias Balart, son of a Batista Senator. But its real founders were the U.S. intelligence and Big Business.

On July 8, 1959, Portuondo sent Nicolas Arroya, former Batista ambassador to Washington, a memorandum about his talk with a certain Mr. Grey who posed as a representative of *Life*. It follows from the memorandum that it was during this conversation that questions related to organising White Rose and financing it from Washington sources were finally thrashed out.¹

White Rose has become a sort of model for other organisations of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in the United States, such as Guerra or Crusade. But the first émigré groups did not become the centres for uniting the Cuban counter-revolutionaries. *New York Daily Mirror* correspondent Winchester wrote at the time that the major weakness of most of these organisations was their close contact with Batista and his government.² The ousted Cuban dictator was so discredited that ties with him were not an asset but a liability for his followers.

In social origin and economic status, the Cuban émigrés were a motley crowd. As revolutionary reforms were effected in Cuba (the most important undoubtedly being the land reform initiated in May 1959), the differentiation of the class forces was accelerated in the country.

The Batista men were followed into exile by bankers, owners of sugar refineries and latifundists. Then came the middle class and also many engineers, lawyers, doctors, and so on. Finally came the turn of the petty bour-

¹ *El Diario nacional*, Nov. 13, 1959.

² See *New York Daily Mirror*, Nov. 8, 1959.

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rison in Puerto Barrios. Cuban émigré pilots not only transported government troops to the battle area, but also bombed and strafed rebel positions. Under the guidance of U.S. "advisers", the Cuban émigrés, together with Guatemalan gendarmes, take part in operations against guerrillas and torture prisoners.

In Argentina, it was the *gusanos* who raided the headquarters of the Communist Party in Buenos Aires last January. It is indicative that the first reports of the raid came from the United Press International from Miami.

The United States has assigned the Cuban counter-revolutionaries an important place in the struggle against the national-liberation movement not only in the separate countries but also on a continental scale. In September 1962, the Pentagon organised a kind of experimental "foreign legion" detachment: a so-called Maceo Battalion was set up in Miami, consisting mostly of Cuban émigrés and a small number of other "volunteers". Donald A. Miller, former U.S. marine sergeant, was appointed commander. The "legionnaires" are drilled, taught jungle fighting and practise shooting at a firing range kindly provided by the Miami police.

The American press predicted that Cuban "refugees" joining the U.S. army would, after training, serve not only in the United States or the Panama Canal Zone, but would possibly be sent to other areas to reinforce the mainstays of the "free world", South Viet-Nam being specified as an eventual area.

Subsequent international developments confirmed these forecasts, but modified the "geography" of their use. World opinion also knows about the participation of Cuban émigré pilots in hostilities in the Congo on the side of the Tshombe regime.

New facts concerning the subversive activities of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in Central America have recently come to light. Last May, the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica, meeting in closed session, was given irrefutable evidence that *gusanos* headed by Manuel Artime

had been implicated in the unsuccessful attempt of local reactionary forces to overthrow the Government of President Orlich two months earlier. Together with the fascist thugs of the Free Costa Rica organisation, the *gusanos* were to constitute the main striking force of the contemplated putsch.

"Artime's military group," the Costa Rican weekly *Libertad* stressed, "has turned into a mobile army which serves the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and is used to stage putsches in Caribbean countries." It is not surprising, therefore, that Artime was the first to offer the reactionary Dominican junta his help, i.e., to place at General Wessin y Wessin's disposal 1,500 armed *gusanos* to fight against the constitutionalists.

SUCH is the sad record of the Cuban counter-revolutionary émigrés of more than six years. But it is a natural one. Men without a country, without honour and without hope, the *gusanos* have been reduced to small change in the hands of the U.S. imperialists.

The activities of the Cuban counter-revolutionary émigrés bring to mind events of the none too distant past. Here is a curious incident related by the *New York Worker*.

"An old man of 75 asked a young fellow to help him across the street at one of the busy corners in Miami. The young man obliged.

"'Are you Cuban?' the old man asked.

"'Yes,' answered the young man.

"'Do you expect to go back to Cuba?'

"'Yes, as soon as Castro and his Communist regime fall.'

"'I was born in Russia,' said the old man. And then he added: 'I came to this country 43 years ago, thinking to return as soon as Russia's Communist regime would fall. I am still waiting.'

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geoisie and the fortune hunters, the brothel keepers, pimps, criminals, and ordinary men misled by reactionary propaganda. Renegades, men who had fought against Batista but had then switched over to the counter-revolutionary camp, also fled to the United States.

The U.S. authorities, far from hampering the influx of counter-revolutionaries, did everything to encourage it. According to press reports, the Administration spent between \$135,000 and \$500,000 a month for the maintenance of the "refugees". Small wonder then that the bulk of the counter-revolutionary émigrés from Cuba—over 200,000 people—have settled in the United States. Of them about 160,000 have been concentrated in the south, in Miami, Florida, the nearest U.S. city to Cuba.³ This concentration was not a matter of chance either.

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower signed an order on the secret preparation by the Central Intelligence Agency of an invasion of Freedom Island. This venture demanded cannon fodder, which the émigrés could provide. Hence the "concern" for them and their concentration in one area. The U.S. authorities hoped that the Cuban counter-revolutionaries would not outstay their welcome. The dollars spent on their maintenance, Washington calculated, had to bring in dividends—the overthrow of the Castro Government—within one year.

C.I.A. INTRODUCES ORDER

A REVOLUTIONARY Democratic Front (R.D.F.) was organised in April 1960 at a meeting of leading Cuban counter-revolutionaries arranged at the Statler Hilton Hotel in New York. The meeting was directed by Frank Bender, a high official of the C.I.A., who held all the strings of the anti-Cuban plot in his hands. At the same time, the first mercenaries recruited by the C.I.A. for the Cuban invasion appeared in Guatemala on the giant Helvetia estate, which belongs to the latifundist Alejos.

It is indicative that both processes—the political consolidation of the émigrés and the training of mercenaries—proceeded almost independently of each other. The counter-revolutionary organisations were to act as recruiting centres and had nothing to do with the training and equipping of the invasion army. Only once, in mid-February 1961, were the leaders of the R.D.F. allowed a short visit to the centres for the training of counter-revolutionary bands in Guatemala. After this a shroud of secrecy again descended on the preparations for the invasion. Miró Cardona, one of the counter-revolutionary ringleaders, said a few days before the invasion of Playa Giron: "I'm like a cab driver, I don't know where I'll be in ten minutes..."⁴

Five organisations were admitted into the R.D.F. Some of them (Partido Auténtico and the Christian-Democrat Movement) arose in Cuba prior to the victory of the revolution; the others were set up in the course of the struggle

of imperialism and local reactionary forces against the revolutionary Government of Fidel Castro. The official programme of the R.D.F. called for the restoration of the old order, but without Batista and the "excesses" of his tyranny. To add conviction to the programme, the founders of the "Front" announced that they rejected those who had collaborated with Batista.

But the organisation of the R.D.F. did not eliminate the division in the ranks of the émigrés; the wrangles between its various groups and the ambitions of their leaders were much too strong. Émigré groups, organisations and factions continued to multiply; at the end of 1960, the most conservative estimates put their number well above the 100-mark. The largest of them, after the R.D.F., was the People's Revolutionary Movement headed by Manuel Ray, who had been Minister of Public Works in the revolutionary Castro Government until November 1959. This organisation, which had an armed underground branch in Cuba, camouflaged the real nature of its activity by revolutionary phraseology, to the extent of advocating social reform in Cuba.

The U.S. intelligence readily utilised the "Movement" for organising sabotage and terrorism on the island, and for gathering intelligence. But the R.D.F. remained the pet of the C.I.A. It was the branches of the R.D.F. in Miami, New York and other cities that became the chief centres for recruiting Cuban cannon fodder.

Not relying on the "political awareness" of the counter-revolutionaries, the leaders of the "Front" widely applied economic and political pressure to get the émigrés to enrol into the "invasion army". To this end, many counter-revolutionary organisations introduced in their programmes a special point that persons evading armed struggle against Castro would be deprived of the right to repossess their property in Cuba "after victory", a point which affected mainly the wealthier sections of the counter-revolutionaries. As for the mass of the *gusanos* (worms), as the Cuban people aptly named the counter-revolutionary scum, they were threatened with a cut-off of U.S. subsidies and hand-outs.

To smother the hostility between the "Front" and the other émigré organisations, the C.I.A. compelled them to sign an agreement on the establishment of a "Revolutionary Council" and the appointment of a Havana lawyer, José Miró Cardona, as the "provisional president" of Cuba.

In the long run, the C.I.A. succeeded in recruiting several thousand counter-revolutionaries. Brigade 2506 trained in Guatemala became the backbone of the "invasion army" and in April 1961 it was landed on Playa Giron. But before the mercenaries stepped on Cuban soil, the U.S. intelligence "introduced order" in the ranks of the émigrés.

Most of the top appointments in Brigade 2506 (made in January 1961) went to former Batista men. This "violation" of the principles of the "Front" caused a commotion among a section of the mercenaries. Some of them even declared a strike, refusing to serve under the "tyrant's henchmen", but they were given a swift reminder by C.I.A. men in Guatemala that he who pays the piper calls the

³ New York Herald Tribune, May 24, 1963.

⁴ Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs*, New York, 1964, p. 71.

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tune. The rebellious mercenaries were arrested and sent to a special concentration camp in a remote area in the Guatemalan province of Petén.

The political leaders of the counter-revolution also learned before long that U.S. intelligence was not going to stand on ceremony. On April 16 (that is, 12 hours before the landing started), all members of the Revolutionary Council who were meeting at the Hotel Lexington in New York were taken into custody by C.I.A. men and brought to a deserted airfield in Opa-Locka, Florida. It was there, in a dilapidated shed, that the political leaders of the counter-revolution, fully cut off from the outside world, spent the critical days of the landing. That the invasion had begun they learned only from U.S. radio broadcasts flashing releases of "Communiqué No. 1 of the Cuban Revolutionary Council". Naturally the detainees at Opa-Locka took no part whatsoever in drawing up this communiqué, or any of the others issued in their name by the U.S. radio stations. Miró Cardona and his associates were released only on April 20. By that time Brigade 2506 had been reduced to a demoralised crowd seeking refuge in the marshes of Zapata Peninsula.

The Bay of Cochinos fiasco confronted U.S. ruling circles with many acute foreign policy problems. Subsequent events showed that the defeat of the intervention had also told on U.S. domestic policy. At first this was not so noticeable, but as time went on it became increasingly clear that it was instrumental in exacerbating the internal struggle in the United States, which culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy.

THE "DECISIVE BLOW" THAT FAILED

THE failure of the Bay of Cochinos gamble meant that the departure of the 200,000 Cuban "guests" from the United States was to be indefinitely postponed. Within a few days, all of the C.I.A.'s "organisational" work among the *gusanos* was reduced to naught. The blasted hopes for an early return home bred despair, rage and hysteria among the émigrés. This was extensively utilised by leaders of the Republican Opposition in their own interests.

The defeat in the Bay of Pigs also had important repercussions for the C.I.A. leadership. In 1961, the entire top echelon of the C.I.A., including Allen Dulles who headed it for many years, was replaced. Moreover, as a kind of counterbalance to the discredited C.I.A., a new intelligence agency was set up in the Department of Defence.

Washington had to exert much effort to pacify the émigrés so as to secure the possibility of using them again for counter-revolutionary purposes. Sensing the support of the U.S. ultras, the leaders of the *gusanos* made increasing demands. It was only on October 31 that a secret agreement put relations between the "Revolutionary Council" and the U.S. Government on a new basis. The latter promised to organise another invasion of Cuba, while the "Revolutionary Council" pledged to take no action without Washington's knowledge and to place at the disposal of

the U.S.A. the necessary number of "volunteers". Henceforward the Cuban mercenaries were to undergo training directly in the ranks of the U.S. army. Preparations for the new invasion were directed not by C.I.A. agents, but by Pentagon generals.

The rest of 1961 and almost 10 months of 1962 were spent in feverish anti-Cuban activities. Recruiting centres again opened their doors, training centres resumed operations. Mercenaries had to undergo a screening before being drilled by Pentagon-appointed instructors. Simultaneously the final details of an invasion of Freedom Island by U.S. armed forces were being worked out. In these plans detachments of Cuban mercenaries were assigned the part of a "smoke-screen" designed somehow to cover up intervention by U.S. marines.

But the "decisive blow" at Cuba did not materialise. Plans for military intervention had to be abandoned in the grim days of October 1962, when Washington was made aware that any encroachment on Freedom Island would invite powerful retaliation.

The settlement of the Caribbean crisis by peaceful means was acclaimed by broad circles of American and world opinion, but the U.S. "wild men" and the ringleaders of the Cuban counter-revolutionaries were enraged. For the *gusanos*, the easing of tension meant blighted hopes for a return to Cuba, and relations between their leaders and Washington entered a period of crisis.

HITTING BOTTOM

MORE than a year and a half have passed since President Kennedy's assassination. Has anything changed in the condition of the Cuban émigrés in the United States?

The facts show that the *gusanos* continue to degenerate and wallow in despair. The problem of "settling" in the United States is insoluble, plans for a "return" to Cuba are obviously unrealistic, the people's system in Cuba is growing stronger, the relation of forces in the world is further changing in favour of Socialism—all this accelerates the disintegration among the Cuban émigrés.

Describing their condition, *Bohemia*, a Cuban magazine, stresses that these men find themselves at the bottom of the U.S. social scale.⁵ Quoting *Jet*, a Negro magazine published in the United States, *Bohemia* points out that the Cubans are taking jobs formerly designated for Negroes and work for such low wages that some employers hire two Cubans for a Negro's wages. Some Cubans work merely for food or shelter. Cuban doctors and skilled technicians work alongside Negroes on farms near Miami, but longer hours and for less pay. *Jet* notes that since Miami became the refuge for the Cuban émigrés, thousands of Negroes have lost their jobs. About 15 per cent of the city's population has become unemployed because "Negro jobs" have been taken by Cubans. This acute social problem has caused a great deal of trouble to the local authorities as well. Ro-

⁵ See *Bohemia*, Feb. 14, 1964, p. 27.

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bert King, Miami's mayor, once said that an influx of people without means of subsistence inevitably affected the economy. He gave the example of a Cuban refugee, who had been chairman of the Havana board of lawyers, and now worked as a waiter in a Miami hotel.

That is not the only case either. The refugees oust Negroes mainly from unskilled jobs. A former member of the Cuban Supreme Court is a dish-washer in a Miami restaurant; a well-known Cuban lawyer was happy to get a job in a garage, architects, chemists and bookkeepers work as doormen and lift attendants in local hotels.⁶

Moral problems pertaining to race discrimination in the U.S.A. are also an important factor. For many Cuban émigrés life in the United States is doubly tragic because they had received their education in southern U.S. colleges and had assimilated the racial prejudices of their teachers and of the chiefs of the Batista regime. Now they find themselves in a position where they have to hunt for "Negro jobs".

SCABS AND DOPE PEDDLARS

THE influx of Cuban émigrés had added to the sense of insecurity among Miami inhabitants. Employers have spread rumours about the firing of workers and the "hiring of cheaper" Cuban labour, and have then cut wages all round. The *gusanos* do not even shun strike-breaking. Jerry Schwartz, an active Miami trade unionist, says that to call a strike is tantamount to inviting the Cubans to break it.

U.S. ruling circles must have expected that such a concentration of Cuban refugees would be a propaganda asset to condition the country's population to the thought that it is necessary to "help" them "liberate" Cuba. They also thought that the mass exodus of specialists and skilled workers would weaken the Cuban revolution, plunge the country into economic difficulties and so prepare the ground for armed intervention and restoration of the old order.

These plans have failed completely. Cuba has coped with the training of specialists for all branches of her economy, while the anti-Cuban, anti-Communist campaign started over the "refugees" problem has boomeranged: those who were to have been won over by it, according to the C.I.A. and State Department plan, have come out against the "dishonest competition" of the *gusanos*, with the result that the generally hostile attitude to the Cuban émigrés has increased.

The U.S. press has recently been compelled to pay more attention to the growing ties between the Cuban émigrés and the criminal underworld and their participation in the illicit narcotics trade. Together with local members of the mafia, *gusanos* have organised a ramified network for smuggling and trade in narcotics. California, Florida and, naturally, New York have become centres of these activities.

⁶ See Maria A. Gonzalez, *Bajo palabra*, Havana, 1963.

Illicit trade in narcotics with the participation of Cuban émigrés has assumed vast proportions. Local and Federal officials are compelled to speak about it. R. Bellinger, chief of the Miami anti-narcotics squad, said at the end of November 1964 that there was danger of a complete breakdown of narcotics control in Miami.⁷ Lester D. Johnson, head of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, told newsmen last December that despite the measures taken by the police the illicit narcotics trade had sharply increased in 1964 as compared with 1963: that year, his men had confiscated a total of 3,000 kg of marijuana, heroin and other narcotics—2,378 kg more than in 1963.

The crime wave among Cuban émigrés in the U.S.A. is largely due to the gradual decline in Federal assistance. Washington has been cutting its grants to Cuban émigrés steadily, in order to compel some to move from Miami to other areas and find work there (which is now almost impossible) or to enlist as "volunteers" in the U.S. army to be utilised as mercenaries by U.S. imperialism. Some émigrés prefer crime to either "choice", and the ordinary *gusano*, in fact, has no alternative.

"SOMEWHERE IN CENTRAL AMERICA"

IN November 1964, the Columbia Broadcasting System showed millions of viewers a short documentary of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in training. Sinister faces of saboteurs dressed in the same camouflage uniforms, harking back to the days of the Bay of Pigs, flashed on the TV screen. They had machine guns and mortars, tanks and landing craft with clearly visible U.S. markings.

The C.B.S. did not reveal the exact location of the *gusano* camps, but reports in Central American and U.S. newspapers give an idea of their whereabouts and the purpose for which Washington is grooming the mercenaries.

A group of saboteurs, led by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a counter-revolutionary leader, landed on the Cuban coast on December 28, 1964. They were caught and during the interrogation, given on the Cuban TV, Menoyo and his accomplices admitted that their organisation, the Second Escambray Front, had engaged in direct military operations against revolutionary Cuba in the form of piratical raids on merchant vessels and industrial enterprises along the Cuban coast. The bandits gave interesting details about the military training of Cuban émigré gangs in Caribbean countries, specifically Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

Subversive organisations of Cuban émigrés have operational bases in Puerto Rico where they enjoy the open patronage of the island's governor. Their main support point is located at Playa Joyuda between Mayaguez and Cabo-Rojo. Of still greater interest are the mercenary training camps in the Dominican Republic, that is, close to Cuba's shores.

It is hard to give the exact number of places in the Dominican Republic, with training camps, bases and ferry

⁷ See Hoy, Nov. 29, 1964.

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centres for the Cuban émigrés. Here is a typical instance. A training camp for members of the Second Escambray Front, the People's Revolutionary Movement and Alpha 66 is situated in a small town named Punta Presidente in Mansanillo Bay. Here the *gusanos* are taught how to use wireless equipment, read maps, handle arms, are made to walk long distances over broken terrain, and so on. Until recently, they had been supplied with weapons and other equipment by the Dominican reactionary junta, with contacts being maintained through Dominican General Atila Luna and Colonel Juan Folch.

During their last meeting in December 1964, Colonel Folch told Gutierrez Menoyo that he "had spoken with the President [evidently the head of the military "triumvirate" then in power in the Dominican Republic.—*Author.*] and the President had given the Menoyo group the 'green light' to leave Santo Domingo for Cuba at any time".

After the televised interrogation of Gutierrez Menoyo, a group of foreign correspondents in Santo Domingo asked the authorities for permission to visit Punta Presidente to see whether Menoyo was telling the truth. They were refused permission on the pretext that the area around Punta Presidente was too marshy.

In January 1965, the Dominican authorities began to evict the population from Saona Island so as to set up another base for provocations against revolutionary Cuba. "The *gusanos* who are trained on Catalina Is.," the newspaper *14 de Junio*, published in Santo Domingo, pointed out, "will be transferred to the new base to continue training which will enable them to resume their anti-Cuban acts of piracy."⁶

Two more C.I.A. agents, Elpidio Delgado Soto and Nilo Luis Alonso Morejon, were caught on the Las Salinas coast in Pinar del Rio province. Their testimony, supplementing Menoyo's, throws more light on Washington's anti-Cuban activities in training counter-revolutionaries and using them for provocations against Freedom Island.

Soto and Morejon had been recruited by the C.I.A. and, after passing through a number of processing centres, were sent on board the *Joan*, a ship sailing under the Liberian flag, to a training camp in Costa Rica. The camp, named Sarapiquí, stands at the confluence of the Sarapiquí and Suelo rivers, on an estate owned by Wico Star, who maintains liaison between the Costa Rican authorities and Arttime, head of the Cuban mercenaries in that country. The camp consists of a landing strip, a house for 10 or 12 Yankee instructors, and six barracks for the "trainees" near the jungle. In contrast to old C.I.A. tactics of concentrating several hundred mercenaries in one camp, "training" is now done in small groups of 25 or 30 men, but these have a real arsenal of modern weapons at their disposal.

Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica are not the only countries where C.I.A. camps for training Cuban mercenaries have been organised. The Nicaraguan newspaper *La Prensa* reported late last year that such

camps were operating in Zelaya department, in Bluefields, near Prinzapolca and elsewhere on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. There are also camps in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Developments in recent months show that the C.I.A. intends to change its tactics and go over from "harassing raids" on merchant shipping and installations on the Cuban coast to provocations on a larger scale. Speaking over the *La Voz del Tropico* radio on February 26, Manuel Mora Valverde, First Secretary of the People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica, said that Cuba's enemies were planning to bomb some cities in Central American countries and then pin the blame on Cuba's Revolutionary Government.

PENTAGON'S "FOREIGN LEGION"

THE functions the C.I.A. now assigns to the Cuban mercenaries are not limited to training and taking part in anti-Cuban piratical "operations". With Washington's blessing, gangs of *gusanos* are extensively utilised by the ruling circles of Central American and some South American countries for combating their democratic forces and nation-liberation movements. On the advice of the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, they are incorporated in the police, gendarmerie and other repressive agencies.

More than 16,000 *gusanos*, for example, are concentrated in Venezuela. Most of them have been "trained" in government camps or have been utilised for punitive operations in guerrilla areas or as paid informers and agents provocateurs. Progressive Venezuelans said that the Black Cross, a secret fascist organisation set up for terrorist purposes, consisted mostly of former Batista secret servicemen.

The "freely associated state" of Puerto Rico offers a typical example of the use of the *gusanos* against progressive forces and organisations. A considerable section of the Cuban counter-revolutionaries who have fled to Puerto Rico are employed as mercenary "storm troopers" of the Puerto Rican authorities. They enjoy the patronage of avowed fascist organisations and "specialise" in provocations against democratic leaders and the breaking up of meetings and demonstrations.

Last December, the authorities of San Juan, the Puerto Rican capital, tried with the aid of the Cuban mercenaries to break up a meeting arranged by the University Federation for Independence. Juan Mari Bras, general secretary of the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, has said that the Cuban counter-revolutionaries are employed by the U.S. imperialists for the foulest provocations against this organisation, specifically for raiding its premises and planting bombs in the homes of its leaders.

In Guatemala, counter-revolutionaries have long been used to suppress the democratic forces. D. Wise and T. Ross, authors of the book *Invisible Government*, published in 1964, were the first to tell the world that as early as November 1960 trained *gusanos* made up the core of the punitive force sent to suppress the mutiny of the gar-

⁶ Quoted after *Hoy*, Jan. 17, 1965.

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